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FOREWORD 
A two-day conference on labour movements in Latin America since 
1930, supported by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation, was 
held at the University of London Institute of Latin American 
Studies on 9-10 March 1979- The organisers were Leslie Bethell, 
Reader in Hispanic American and Brazilian History at University 
College London, and Juan Carlos Torre of the Instituto Di Telia, 
Buenos Aires and Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Latin 
American Studies. The conference was attended by more than 30 
university teachers, visiting scholars, research fellows and 
graduate students - historians, sociologists, political 
scientists and economists - from ten British universities. 
Almost half the participants were from Latin America (mostly 
from Brazil and Chile). Papers were presented by Juan Carlos 
Torre (on Argentina), Alan Angell (on Peru), Regis de Castro 
Andrade (on Brazil), Gonzalo Falabella (on Chile) and Ian 
Roxborough (on Mexico). Because of the unusual quantity of 
new material they bring together - each constitutes the most 
important single work available in English on its subject -
and because of their common theme - the experience of organised 
labour under a military regime - the Institute has decided to 
publish the papers on organised labour in Peru since 1968 and 
Chile since 1973 as Nos. 3 and 4 in its Working Papers series. 
Leslie Bethell 

Peruvian Labour and the Military Government since 1968 
Popular protest, both urban and rural, has a long and often 
violent tradition in Peru. But the style and organisation of ~ 
such protest bears the characteristics of the traditional forms 
of popular agitation in societies before the formation of social 
classes based on the development of a capitalist system. Such 
agitation is often local or regional rather than national, 
unites disparate social groups, lacks persistent organisation, 
can sometimes be very effective as a defensive force, employs 
violence, tends to flare up and as suddenly to die away, and is 
open to manipulation by politicians and coercion by the state. 
Yet the root causes of such protest lie dormant, unless positive 
social and economic change removes them, and can flare up again 
at times of economic distress. 
Protest organised by trade unions, when such organisations 
are strong and account for a large part of the active labour 
force, takes a different form and calls for a different response 
from the government and the dominant class. Such protest is or-
ganised, is often limited to a small sector but a sector of con-
siderable economic weight. Grievances tend to be more specific, 
even predictable, and there are well developed forms and insti-
tutions to cope with most though not all expressions of trade 
union discontent. An intelligent government will attempt coop-
tation rather than coercion as a cheaper and potentially more 
successful weapon. 
Although the Peruvian labour movement has its origins in 
the early part of the twentieth century, amongst the usual 
groups of bakers, port workers and textile workers, and with the 
then influential ideological covering of anarcho-syndicalism, 
it cannot be said that the labour movement was much of a threat 
to government and employers for most of its history. In a 
society where the vast majority of the workers were poor agri-
cultural labourers of one form or another, and where industry 
was only weakly developed it could hardly be otherwise. There 
were sectors where labour had some influence but that influence 
was local and often channelled through a party, the Apra, that, 
at least from the 1940s, intended to use what little power 
labour had in a game of opportunistic politics without any real 
commitment to social reform. 
The last two decades however have seen considerable 
changes, one of which has been the growth of a national labour 
movement of some importance. Yet this development has taken 
place alongside and in conjunction with the survival of more 
traditional forms of popular protest. My argument is that the 
combination of these two forms of social protest, popular and 
trade union, is a potent political weapon in the hands of the 
urban and rural poor at a time of economic crisis. Such a com-
bination of disparate social forces makes it difficult to 
coordinate effective action, and even more difficult to put for-
ward some common project'. But it also creates problems for 
any government concerned either to coerce or to coopt the popular 
masses and the trade union movement. 
At first sight, perhaps, it seems odd that the Peruvian 
military government, at least in its first phase from 1968 to 
1975 could not control the labour movement either by a policy of 
coercion or of cooptation. Other authoritarian governments in 
Latin America have curbed labour movements far stronger than that 
of Peru. Brazil saw virtually no important strikes between 1968 
and 1978; the Mexican labour movement, perhaps a little unfairly 
has become a byword for the passivity of the rank and file and 
the corruption of its leaders; and the Chilean labour movement, 
the most politicised on the continent was initially demobilised 
and decapitated after the 1973 coup. But even these governments 
are discovering limits to the extent of control over labour; 
Brazil has witnessed massive strikes in the Sao Paulo area, and 
the Chilean labour movement, in spite of extremely fierce anti-
union legislation and some equally fierce illegal repression, 
has shown remarkable capacity to survive and regroup.^ 
The policy of the Peruvian military government was dis-
tinct. The government embarked on a process of reform and 
wanted the collaboration of the labour movement. Initially, 
repression would not have been too difficult* The Peruvian 
labour movement in 1968 was weak, poorly organised (with a few 
exceptions), not extensively politicised but extremely sectarian 
where it was, arid the most numerous force in the labour move-
ment, the CGTP was dominated by the Communist party, a party of 
almost unswerving loyalty to President Velasco and indeed to his 
successor until 1977. 
Extensive repression of the labour movement did not take 
place until 1975, though there were some examples of earlier 
repression; notably against the schoolteachers, the miners, and 
the Pescadores. But the history of government-labour relations 
in the period of cooptation shows that a policy of encouraging 
labour organisation does not necessarily entail labour grati-
tude, that official labour organisations do not necessarily 
remain on the rails laid down by their creators, and that beyond 
a certain point sheer economic and social desperation can turn 
formerly quiescent sectors, (notably schoolteachers) into 
militant and even violent opponents under the banner of the most 
unlikely ideological groups.^ 
Hostility from organised labour was not the only problem 
facing the government in its attempt to construct a social base. 
Indeed, it is difficult to identify any significant social sup-
port for the government (as opposed to the political loyalty 
given by the Communist party, and to some extent and for diffe-
rent aims and, more or less secretly, from the Apra). Entre-
preneurs objected to the creation of the Comunidad Industrial, 
and private investment fell sharply. The agrarian reform 
benefited a considerable proportion of the peasantry, but still 
only a minority and not the poorest minority. The inhabitants 
of the pueblos jovenes saw a mushrooming of neighbourhood com-
mittees and an improvement in basic facilities and services, 
but there was no increase in regular, secure and reasonably paid 
employment.5 
Did opposition from the labour movement matter a great 
deal? It did, both positively and negatively. Negatively, for 
the government embarked upon a process of repression and control 
that undermined its credentials to be launching a true Peruvian 
revolution. Positively, in the sense that of all groups likely 
to benefit from the style of economic modernisation proposed by 
the government, organised labour would be amongst the most 
favoured.6 If therefore the government could not gain the sup-
port of that group, what hope was there of generating support 
amongst other less favoured sectors? A more socialist redis-
tributionist policy might have attracted widespread popular 
support outside the ranks of organised labour, but the number 
of military men prepared to push through such policies were too 
few and too powerless.^ 
But when the government switched from cooptation to coer-
cion, it proved equally unsuccessful, perhaps because it had 
left it too late. It is always easier to coerce from a position 
of strength thaft from one of weakness. Schoolteachers took to 
the streets and became the focal point for numerous local, 
regional and national demonstrations of hostility towards the 
government. The copper miners endured severe repression but 
remained loyal to their ultra-left leaders. The Pescadores 
threw off the corrupt leadership imposed by Fisheries Minister 
General Tantalean. The manufacturing unions in CONACI moved to 
the left as the government moved to the right. Even the govern-
ment's own labour creation, the CTRP, deserted in Lima to join 
with the majority of the labour movement in opposition to the 
government. Arrests, deportations, repression and suspension 
of constitutional guarantees - all on admittedly a much smaller 
scale than in Chile or Uruguay - failed to halt mounting resent-
ment as the working class, both white collar and manual, faced 
a sharp drop in living standards as the economic crisis was 
tackled with IMF style austerity policies.8 
In July 1977, Peru witnessed a massive and national general 
strike. The labour movement had come a long way from its weak-
ness and relative political unimportance in 1968. How did this 
come about? To start to answer this question, we have first to 
look at the size and structure of the movement. 
The structure of employment. 
Although the number of unionised workers has increased 
quite sharply since 1968 (though not as sharply as the number of 
unions), nevertheless, the limits on trade union organisation 
imposed by the structure of the active labour force are quite 
considerable. 
Evolution of the structure of the labour force by economic 
sectors. %. 
Year 1940 1961 1972 
PRIMARY 64.2 52.0 44.3 
Agriculture 62.1 49.1 42.0 
Fishing 0.3 0.7 0.9 
Mining 1.8 2.2 1.4 
SECONDARY 17.3 16.5 17.0 
Manufacturing 15.4 13.2 12.8 
Construction 1.9 3.3 4.2 
TERTIARY 16.9 27.8 34.5 
Basic services N/A 3.7 4.5 
(transport, electricity, 
gas, water) 
Commerce 4.5 8.9 10.5 
Other services 10.3 15.2 19.4 
Non-specified activities 1.6 3.7 4. 2 
100 100 100 
Sources: National Census Returns, cited in Denis Sulmont et al. 
Informe Sindical 1977 (Lima: Nticleo Laboral, Catholic Univer-
sity 1977)p.59. 
Excluding agriculture from the figures, it is clear that 
the occupational structure is one heavily weighted towards em-
ployees (mainly in commerce and services) and towards so called 
independent workers (in effect many of whom are underemployed). 
































Source: official figures cited in William Bollinger, 'The 
Bourgeois Revolution in Peru1, Latin American Perspectives, 
Summer 1977, p.39 
The existence of such a large 'independent1 sector of the 
work force places limits on the extent of trade union growth. 
In 1955 the Central Bank estimated that, overall, 55% of the 
labour force consisted of independent workers and 45% of sala-
ried workers; by 1972 the figures were the reverse.^ Neverthe-
less it should not be assumed that the independent workers 
cannot organise. In certain sectors they are indeed quite well 
organised - market workers and choferes for instance. Moreover 
the urban poor can and do participate in mass mobilisations? 
either with the leadership of the trade union movement, as in 
the general strike of July 1977, or without them, as in the 
riots following the police strike of February 1975. 
Even that sector of the work force classified as manual 
labour is dominated numerically by the artjsanal sector, a sector 
that rather than diminishing is in fact increasing in size both 
relatively and absolutely. 
Manufacturing labour force 
1961 1971 
nos. in thousands. % nos. in thousands. % 
total 405.7 620.8 
factory sector 
(5 workers or more) 164.3 36.1 216 34.8 
Artisanal 
(1 to 4 workers) 259.4 63.9 404.8 65.2 
Source: Denis Sulmont, Dinamica Actual del Movimiento Obrero Pe-
ruano, (Taller de Estudios Urbanos Industriales, Catholic Uni-
versity, Lima, 1972) pp.11/12. 
But even most factories are very small; 44.3% of factories 
in the manufacturing sector employ between 5 and 9 workers; only 
10.3% employ between 50 and 199; and only 1.9% employ 200 or 
more workers.10 
Sulmont proposes a threefold division of the work force in 
the manufacturing sector.^ Firstly, there is a traditional fac-
tory sector with a majority of workers of long professional and 
union experience, but whose firms are being rendered marginal, or 
being dominated or absorbed by the newer enterprises linked to 
the foreign companies that expanded so dramatically in the last 
two decades. This sector is one of longstanding Aprista influ-
ence. Secondly, there is a more recent high technology sector, 
employing younger skilled workers, but without much union ex-
perience. This sector is more combative and more radical, with 
the predominant political influence coming from the Communist 
party and more recently the ultra-left groups. Thirdly, there 
are a large number of unstable workers in small enterprises with 
a low level of union experience and little independent possibili-
ty of forming unions. This was a sector in which the govern-
ment's CTRP made inroads. Howarth's research in Arequipa shows 
that the modern sector of the manufacturing economy is associated 
with support for radical unionism.12 Modern large scale employ-
ment is found not only in manufacturing industry. If are inclu-
ded in this sector the large agro-industrial complexes (mainly 
sugar), the fishing and fishmeal processing industry, the major 
mines and the large construction companies, (in addition to 
manufacturing industry), then it has been estimated that the 
'modern1 sector of the economy employs about 400,000 workers 
(out of a total labour force of some four million). 
What kind of working class is produced by this occupational 
structure and labour market? The answer to this question is 
difficult, and the necessary research on, for example, the 
recruitment of labour has hardly begun. One striking feature is 
the extent of underemployment. In 1974 the Ministry of Labour 
estimated the level of underemployment at 41.9% of the labour 
force and the level of unemployment at 4%. (compared with figures 
of 46.1% and 5.9% respectively for 1969).14 Even for those in 
employment the spread of wages (and conditions) is very great 
and can hardly help working class unity. As Richard Webb writes, 
'Enormous vertical distances characterise more than Peru's geog-
raphy. Almost any subdivision of the population is a sample with 
a high degree of income dispersion. rSocial classes' such as the 
city wage earner or the sierra peasant turn out to be extremely 
heterogeneous with regard to incomes. City wages for instance 
range from about 5000 soles p.a. to 40,000 soles pa. spanning 
three quartiles... The city self employed are even more spread 
out; 15% are in the bottom quartile and 22% in the upper; 8% 
reach into the top decile.'15 
It is hardly surprising that labour turnover is fairly low. 
Holding a secure job is a relatively privileged position that 
workers are anxious to defend. One study found that only 13.6% 
of workers in industrial firms in Lima and Callao had worked in 
their place of employment for a year or less, a comparatively low 
figure of job turnover.* This explains why the issue of legal 
guarantee of job stability has been such a burning issue for the 
labour movement, for employers generally try to avoid legal 
restrictions by hiring workers for short term period of less than 
three months before the legal guarantees come into effect. 
Alison Scott has drawn attention to the extent to which re-
cruitment of labour is organised through the kinship system. 
She writes that 'the continued stability of a young labour force 
in jobs with bad working conditions and low incomes clearly re-
quires explanation. Is it a reflection of an oversupply of 
labour which makes workers hold on to any job they can get, or 
are there institutional factors intervening in the market? How 
much is due to coercive as opposed to volitional elements? My 
argument will be that the kinship system promotes labour stabil-
ity partly because of its provision of cheap labour power within 
petty enterprises, partly because of its control over the 
recruitment system in capitalist as well as petty enterprises and 
partly because it is able to mobilise subsistence goods and ser-
vices for urban workers both in the city and countryside.'17 
And she quotes examples of the capture of occupations by kinship 
groups in such diverse sectors as parts of the local administra-
tion in Cuzco, the mining smelter complex in La Oroya, and on 
some of the sugar plantations - with the support of the local 
trade unions. 
Such examples draw attention to the traditional patterns 
of behaviour that characterise even those sectors of the working 
class that enjoy industrial employment. Any study of the Peru-
vian working class must conclude by emphasising the rural or 
community backgound of many of its members; by the enclave nature 
of much of Peru's economic development and the consequent lack 
of articulation between the various sectors; and by the 
numerical preponderance of the artisanal and petty bourgeois 
sectors.18 A typical left wing analysis of the composition 
of the working class is 
'En nuestro pais, en el movimiento obrero, ademas 
de ser bastante jovenes algunos de sus sectores mias 
dinamicos. existe una marcada influencia de ideas 
proprias del campesinado, el artesanado o la pe-
quena burguesia empobrecida, a la vez que algunas 
capas obreras, sin integrarse al Estado Burgu^s 
Semicolonial, sirven de soportes sociales a la do-
minacion de clase enemiga. No constituyen 'una 
aristocracia obrera' sino mas bien una pequena 
burguesia mercenerizada y burocratica. En los sin-
dicatos todo este se expresa con marcada nitidez, 
haciendo que sea limitado el numero de trabajadores 
organizados que se reproduzca constantemente el 
caudillismo anarco sindicalista y que sectores 
burocraticos se apoyen en las fuerzas intermedias 
en su desarrollo de conciencia como pasa particular-
mente con el revisionismo'19 
There is obviously some truth in this analysis, even if it 
seems to be inspired by the failure of left wing groups to win 
control over the unions from the Communist party, and in parti-
cular, of this left wing group (the Partido Comunista Revolu-
cionario) to match the influence of other left wing groups 
(notably the maoist Patria Roja party). But if the tone of 
such comment seems to imply that the Peruvian working class has 
disappointed its self-appointed leaders, one could with equal 
justice point out that such left wing groups have been more 
conspicuous in trying to use the working class for their own sec-
tarian ends than in attempting to forge any kind of unity. 
The Growth of the Unions. 
The development of unions does not mechanically reflect the 
structure of the economy. Political factors are of great impor-
tance and there is no doubt that the Velasco government 
encouraged unions. As one author puts it 'the most striking fact 
is that the total number of recognised unions almost doubled 
between 1968 and 1975, and that the number of unions in manufac-
turing more than doubled'. 
No. of Unions 
all sectors industry alone 
unions recognised 
before 1968 2152 776 
recognised 1968-1975 2020 931 
total 4172 1707 
Source: Ministry of Labour figures cited in Stephens, op. cit., 
Ch. 5, p.14. 
Nevertheless, the number of unionised workers remains a 
minority of the labour force, concentrated in certain sectors. 
The Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1975 the percentage of 
manufacturing workers in unions was 12%; and in the construction 
industry 22.7%.21 
Most unions in Peru are small, and collective bargaining 
tends to be a function of the plant union. Above this level 
there exist basically three types of federations, the central 
political federations, regional federations, some but not all of 
which are affiliated to the central organisations, and the sec-
toral federations. As the functions of the central national 
federations are political rather than narrowly union, they will 
be dealt with separately. Regional federations tend to be most 
active when a central economic activity of the region runs into 
industrial conflict. The regional federation then mobilises 
mass popular support; for example in the case of the Federacion 
Sindical Departamental de Trabajadores de Ancash (FESIDETA), 
with its support for the fishing workers of the Federaciftn de 
Pescadores in Chimbote, or for the steel workers of SIDERPERU. 
The Federacion Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa (FDTA), 
affiliated to the CGTP has been active in defence of local in-
terests . 
A federation can be formed by five or more unions in the 
same sector, and ten or more unions can form a confederation. 
More than one federation can exist in the same sector, and as 
there is no obligation for an individual union to join a federa-
tion, and as federations do not normally engage in collective 
bargaining, a large number of unions are not affiliated to any 
federation or confederation. According to Stephens, the 'func-
tions of the federations and confederations are primarily to 
provide legal assistance in collective negotiations or individual 
grievances to affiliated unions'.22 However there are a number 
of powerful federations, such as the Federacion de Pescadores 
(FPP) which organises many of the 21,000 fishermen and the 10,000 
fishmeal factory workers; or the Federacion Nacional de Trabaja-
dores Mineros y Metalurgicos del Peru (FNTMMP) associated with 
the ultra-left confederation, CCUSC; or the Federacion de Traba-
jadores Azucareros, (FTA), still under Apra's influence via its 
CTP; or the Federacion de Trabajadores de la Industria Metalica 
del Peru (FETIMP) affiliated to the communist CGTP; or the Fe-
deracion de Trabajadores de Construccion Civil del Peru, affili-
ated to the CGTP. The two most powerful white collar unions are 
the bank employees Federacion de Empleados Bancarios (FEB), which 
organised most of Peru's 30,000 bank workers and which is affil-
iated to the CGTP; and the schoolteachers SUTEP which commands 
the loyalty of most of Peru's 120,000 public schoolteachers and 
which is the mainstay of the CCUSC,23 
Federations use solidarity strikes to help their constit-
uent members, and this form of activity has intensified in recent 
years. Federations also press for more general political demands 
for their members and were prominent in protests against such 
government measures as the dismissals of strike leaders and the 
loss of trade union rights with the suspension of constitutional 
guarantees in 1976. 
Unions and the law. 
State regulation and control over unions is not as exten-
sively embodied in legal statute or a labour code to the same 
extent as in many other Latin American countries. According to 
Sulmont, Peruvian labour legislation is a collection of scattered 
measures dictated by oligarchical regimes to favour the arbitrary 
action of the employers, or as a response to populist pressures.24 
There would seem to be two reasons for this lack of systematic 
incorporation. In the first place, the labour movement was not 
seen until recently as so powerful a force that it could not be 
dealt with by ordinary methods of control by the police and the 
Ministry of Labour. Secondly, until recently the major politi-
cal force in the labour movement was the Apra party, a party 
which had increasingly moved away from any serious commitment to 
social reform. Moreover, given the occupational structure of 
Peru, the very fact that the minimum number of workers needed to 
form a union is twenty, effectively excluded the majority of the 
labour force from forming unions. 
The Ministry of Labour does enjoy very considerable power 
over the formation and registration of unions and over the pro-
cess of collective bargaining, though it is less influential in 
its ability to interfere with the internal functioning of the 
unions. Union leaders are in theory and almost certainly in 
practice scrutinised by the police to try to prevent 
'undesirables' attaining office. And collective bargaining 
demands have to be presented to the Ministry of Labour.25 Union 
finances are not closely controlled by the state, but given the 
poverty of most unions this is not of great consequence.26 But 
what matters less than the letter of the law is the way that it 
is applied, and it has rarely been applied in such a way to 
favour organised labour. 
The military government did want to introduce order into 
the labour sphere. Apparently Minister of Labour Sala Orosco 
proposed a thoroughgoing revision of the labour code in 1973 to 
permit extensive state controlt but other members of the govern-
ment regarded the possible outcome - prolonged conflict with the 
unions - as less desirable than any gain in control. However 
the government did introduce several new decrees in the labour 
field? one of which, regulating stability of employment, in 1970, 
was welcomed by labour. But most of its initiatives were not so 
welcome. In response to waves of strikes in 1971 the government 
attempted to regulate collective bargaining, insisting that 
agreements should be binding for two years. ° Further decrees 
in 1975 attempted to curtail union powers to strike, reactivating 
measures that had been passed in 1913.19 But these efforts were 
not successful. 
As usual in Latin American labour law, state employees in 
general are not supposed to form unions. Schoolteachers were 
exempt from this provision (though SUTEP was not granted legal 
recognition till its victorious strike of 1978). However, as 
is again often the case, state employees can and do form 'asso-
ciations' that in effect act as trade unions. Even so crucial 
an element of the state apparatus as the police went on strike 
for a few very turbulent days in February 1975. (The factors 
behind such a dramatic decision are a microcosm of the problems 
facing Peru: the police objected strongly to their low wages 
and tough conditions of work; they felt a grievance against the 
way that the army had far surpassed them in those respects and 
in political power; and, it is strongly suspected, the Apra had 
a hand in creating and profiting from the trouble). 
Perhaps the greatest controversy in the field of labour 
legislation has been centered around the issue of stability of 
employment, and the governmentrs 1970 decree, the Ley de Estabi-
lidad Laboral. This is naturally a sensitive issue in an econo-
my with a large labour surplus. However, opposition to provi-
sions for job security have not come just from business elements 
who resent any interference with their tight to dismiss workers 
at will - though this is undoubtedly the strongest source of 
that opposition. Other arguments have stressed the negative 
impact of labour stability on employment. It is claimed that 
entrepreneurs will prefer to increase capacity by adding to ma-
chinery rather than employing more labour; that entrepreneurs 
will contract short term labour to avoid the provisions of the 
law, and hence unduly increase labour instability and deny them-
selves the advantages of a skilled and stable labour force; and 
that the 1970 decree weakens labour discipline, reduces incen-
tives and contributes to worsening income distribution.31 
The 1970 decree allowed dismissal for workers who had 
served a three month probationary period in their enterprise on 
two grounds only - a grave misdemeanour (falta grave), or in a 
general reduction of personnel that had previously been author-
ised by the authorities. Moreover the onus of proof was now to 
fall on the employer. This decree was enacted not simply out of 
concern for the workers. Perhaps more important was the govern-
ment's intention to prevent the continuance of the wave of dis-
missals that had accompanied the announcement of the Ley de 
Industrias with its provision for a Comunidad Laboral. The 
government feared that such dismissals would undermine the whole 
projected reform. 
Moreover the 1970 decree was not going to affect the whole 
work force. It would not apply to that half of the work force 
classified as underemployed or unemployed; nor to the 19% clas-
sified as self-employed (por cuenta propria); nor to 13% of the 
state labour force (including schoolteachers); and neither to the 
5% of the labour force 'bajo regimen especial' such as construc-
tion workers. In fact it has been estimated that the law would 
apply only to about 15% of the labour force, mostly in the pri-
vate manufacturing sector and to some state employees (of Petro-
Peru and MineroPeru).And there were still numerous ways in 
which the employers could evade the law and use it as an instru-
ment against trade union leaders or militant workers. The 
question of how strictly the law would be applied was clearly as 
much a political matter as a legal one. 
The decree was modified by the decision in 1976 to allow 
for the immediate suspension of employment in the case of an 
illegal strike (whereas previously it had been only after three 
days of strike and had rarely been used). This decree was used 
effectively against the fishing strike in 1976, the mining strike 
in 1976, and the general strike in 1977. One labour publication 
claimed that there had been 10,000 dismissals in Lima alone in 
1976.33 
With the change of President in 1975, the decree of 1976, 
and the severe economic crisis, the Ley de Estabilidad Laboral 
looked a threadbare protection. 
Strikes. 
The number, intensity and frequency of strikes increased 
considerably during the Velasco period, even before real wages 
started to fall. Labour was responding to a government that 
was initially not automatically inclined to take the employers 
side in industrial disputes. 
There are several ways of explaining this increase. A 
fairly obvious one is the increase in the number of unions, 
though this was less than the increase in the number of strikes. 
New unions seemed anxious to make their mark by initiating strike 
action, and the association with the comunidad laboral in some 
instances was an added factor in labour militancy.34 The general 
political climate following the coup of 1968 was probably the 
most favourable that there ever has been in Peru for industrial 
action. 
Towards the end of the Velasco period primacy has to be 
given to falling real wages and government repression as an 
explanation for labour unrest. 
No. of strikes 
all sectors manufacturing only 
1965 397 191 
1966 394 191 
1967 414 207 
1968 364 198 
1969 372 143 
1970 345 136 
1971 377 184 
1972 409 259 
1973 788 423 
1974 550 313 
1975 779 428 
Source: Ministry of Labour figures cited in Stephens, op.cit., 
Ch. 6. ^ 
Table 6 
Duration, workers affected, and man-hours lost through strikes. 
Average length of Workers affected, 
strike in days. 
Man hours lost 
(millions) 
Nos. % of workers No. 
1965 4.8 135,582 7.3 6.4 
1966 5.9 121,232 6.3 11.7 
1967 4.6 142,282 7.1 8.4 
1968 5.0 107,809 5.2 3.3 
1969 3.4 91,531 4.9 3.9 
1970 5.3 110,990 5.7 5.8 
1971 9.4 161,415 8.6 10.9 
1972 8.5 130,643 6.7 6.3 
1973 14.3 416,251 20.9 15.7 
1974 11.1 362.737 17.6 13.4 
1975 11.7 617,120 29.0 20.2 
1976 258,101 12.0 6.8 
Source: Ministry of Labour figures, cited in Sulmont, Historia, 
p.318. 
Wages, Salaries and Prices; real levels 1968-1975 (for Lima). 
Wages Salaries Price Index 
1968 100 100 100 
1969 115 103 106 
1970 115 101 111 
1971 122 113 119 
1972 126 127 128 
1973 133 134 140 
1974 122 126 163 
1975 
January 122 126 180 
June 104 111 199 
1976 
January 96 108 232 
June 91 102 245 
December 78 91 315 
Falling real wages were only part of the story of worsen-
ing conditions for labour. Unions began to react strongly to 
government manipulation through such creations as the CTRP and 
the MLR. Reaction in the provinces was very marked in 1973 with 
bitter strikes in SIDERPERU which led to a general strike in the 
province of Ancash; and in Arequipa where a regional strike was 
sparked off by the arrest of several leaders of the local SUTE. 
Simple figures of days lost disguise the intensity of these 
local reactions to the policy of the government, the extensive 
and intense involvement of local non-urban labour sectors, and 
the violence of police and military r e p r i s a l s . 
According to Stephens' impressively careful study 'most 
strikes are called by blue collar unions; together with mixed 
unions (which are mostly dominated by blue collar workers) they 
account for 90% of all strikes. White collar strike activity is 
relatively unimportant, varying between 6.7% and 8.7% of all 
strikes, but 1.8% and 5.1% of total workers involved and 2.5% 
and 4.6% of total man hours lost. Federations account for rough-
ly 2% of the total number of strikes, but they mobilise a third 
or more of the total number of workers involved'.37 Most strikes, 
as one would expect, are about wages and working conditions, but 
solidarity strikes are increasingly important accounting for al-
most one third of man hours lost. The manufacturing sector 
accounts for almost half the number of strikes annually; next 
in importance is the mining sector (especially between 1969 and 
Source: Desco. cited in Sulmont, Historia, p.314. I have 
rounded off the figures for simplicity. 
1971) and then the construction sector (especially between 1973 
and 1975). These three sectors, which constitute only 18% of 
the labour force, account for 80% of man hours lost through 
strikes. 
There are also available figures on the man hours lost in 
strikes by unions affiliated to the major confederations. 
Man-hours lost according to central federation. % 
Federation. 1973 1974 1975 
CGTP 47.8 73.4 67.7 
CTP 7.6 0.8 1.8 
CTRP 5.2 5.8 1.6 
CNT 0.3 0.1 0.4 
No afiliados 39.1 19.5 28.5 
100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Labour figures cited by Sulmont, Conflictos 
Laborales y Movilizacicon Popular: Peru 1968-1976, (mimeo, Insti-
tute of Social Studies, the Hague, 1977). p.33. 
Apart from being the most active confederation in sup-
porting strikes the CGTP affiliated unions also have a success 
rate almost equal to that of the government sponsored CTRP. 'In 
over 50% of the CGTP strikes the unions obtained full or at least 
partial satisfaction of their demands'.38 
However, it would be incorrect to ascribe too offensive a 
nature to this increasingly high rate of strike activity. Accor-
ding to one report, about 90% of strikes are a response to 
employer failure to meet legal or collective bargaining obliga-
t i o n s . ^ Moreover, many unions though they may be legally 
registered, in practice hardly function at all. Stephens draws 
the conclusion that 'the main function of unions in Peru is a 
defensive one, mainly against firings, transfers, changes in 
work rules, in bonuses, reduction of wages etc.. Not all unions 
engage in collective bargaining; eg. in 1971 a total of 701 col-
lective contracts were concluded, and in 1972 another 922; if we 
assume that most unions who do conclude collective contracts 
renew them at least every other year - and many do it every year 
- we can estimate that only 48% of the recognised unions in 1972 
did engage in collective bargaining. 
While this argument is undoubtedly true, it misses a di-
mension. It underestimates the 'aggressive1 nature of many large 
strikes in Peru, strikes which because they are 'illegal' may 
escape official tabulation. For example, SUTEP strikes often 
involve a large proportion of Peru's teachers and mobilise many 
local groups in support. And SUTEPls strikes are certainly 
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aggressively political even if they are inseparably linked to 
the economic grievances of the teachers. Local and regional 
mobilisations like those of Chimbote or Arequipa in 1973 are al-
most certainly underestimated in the official figures and the 
sheer size and intensity of such strikes poses a sharp challenge 
to the legitimacy of the government. 
As the government moved towards a policy attempting to con-
trol union affairs more closely than in the past, worker protests 
expressed a more profound rejection of those attempts and the 
strike demands reflected this in their more obviously political 
content. One commentator claims that 1975 saw greater unity of 
the union movement in coordinating strikes at the federation 
level and in coordinating demands for greater worker participation 
in control over working conditions. 
What is also notable about worker mobilisation from 1975 
onwards is the way that it seems to be in advance of the trade 
union leadership. The weakness and reluctance of the national 
leadership, notably the CGTP, failed to provide the necessary 
central coordination to articulate the various regional or sec-
toral protests into a national movement.43 Indeed the parallel 
with the development of poder popular in Chile emerges, especial-
ly in cases as that of the manufacturing sector of Vitarte, on 
the Carretera Central to Lima, where a popular mobilisation in 
defence of striking workers brought out an estimated 10,000 
inhabitants establishing control over the sector for a few days 
in defiance of the military.^ The state owned steel works at 
Chimbote were the scene of a fifty two day strike in late 1977 
and early 1978. Of considerable importance in securing the 
victory of the strike (including a demand for the reinstatement 
of 240 workers dismissed for their role in the strike) were the 
popular mobilisations in Chimbote and Ancash province, including 
three provincial general strikes and mass meetings with partici-
pation of over 20,000 people.45 However, one must not exaggera-
te their political strength. As with similar movements in Chile 
there is a large gap between popular anger and effective politi-
cal strategies, and between momentary popular unity and long 
term unity on the left, for the Peruvian left is particularly 
sectarian. Even Hugo Blanco has warned against reading too much 
into these apparently embrionic forms of poder popular. 
The most dramatic mobilisation occurred on July 19th 1977, 
when even the CGTP lent its support to the call for a one day 
general strike in protest against the government's general econ-
omic policy and in particular against the attack on trade union 
rights. Even though it must have been clear to union leaders 
that there was immense popular support for such a move, not all 
the parties of the left agreed to take part. The miners of 
Centromfn for example argued that as the CGTP was taking part 
the strike would serve only to strengthen 'social imperialism' 
(that is Moscow communism). As the government hastily proclaimed 
a school holiday, the teachers in SUTEP were not officially in-
volved, though it is doubtful whether their leadership would have 
given more than lukewarm support. Moreover, the CGTP was only 
persuaded reluctantly into the strike and broke with the 
organisation set up to run the strike, the Comando Unitario de 
Lucha, soon after the strike, thereby impeding the possibility 
of developing a long term unity strategy for confronting the 
government. Even the Lima branch of the government's own CTRP 
supported the strike, and indeed played an active role. 
It would have been fatal for the union movement not to have 
organised some kind of mass protest against the government's 
policy. Yet it is claimed that the union national leaderships 
did little more than set the date for the strike, and that the 
actual organisational initiative was very much a spontaneous 
response often from people with no previous trade union experi-
ence. How far that is true is difficult to tell, but it was 
certainly a very impressive mobilisation for such a relatively 
weakly organised labour movement. What is undoubtedly true is 
that the political differences between the various confederations 
lost what advantage might have been gained from such a display of 
strength.49 The inability to recreate such a level of unity has 
led to several failures in the attempt to organise subsequent 
general strikes; notably that for the 20th September 1977 which 
was organised by sectors of the extreme left without the support 
of the CGTP, or the CTRP Lima which was a flop; the strike timed 
for 28th January 1978 which was aborted when the CGTP withdrew 
in deference to the government's call for national unity in the 
(unlikely) event of a war with Ecuador; and that for January 
1979 when the CGTP refused to cooperate fully with the left's 
call for a strike on the grounds that it might provoke a coup 
from the extreme right.50 
Although the government has occasionally conceded the econo-
mic demands of the strikers (as in the case of the SUTEP strike 
of mid 1978) its normal response has been that of repression; 
dismissal of striking workers, arrests and deportations of union 
leaders, and suspension of guarantees. This response is under-
standable. The present economic crisis does not allow much lee-
way for concessions. Nevertheless, the government's response 
throughout has been primarily political. This is undoubtedly 
a reflection of the style and policies of the government itself, 
but it is also a response to the high level of politicisation 
of the trade union leadership at the national level, and it is to 
this area that we must now turn. 
Unions and politics: the central federations. 
At the central level unions are highly politicised. 
Table 9 shows the division between the various central organi-
sations of those unions which are affiliated to such confedera-
tions (which does not include all unions, though it does include 
the largest, and most of the important federations). 
Union Affiliations to the Confederation: 1976. % 
Federation Industrial Sector National 
CTP 21 13 
CGTP 26 23 
CNT 5 2 
CTRP 19 36 
No afiliados 29 13 
CCUSC X 13 
100 100 
X included in CGTP and non-affiliated. 
Sources: for the industrial sector, Ministerio de Industria y 
Turismo; for national figures, SINAMOS. Cited in Sulmont et al. 
Informe Sindical, p.29. 
a. The Confederaciffn General de Trabajadores del Peru (CGTP) 
The largest confederation is the CGTP founded in June 1968, 
and recognised by the government in July 1971. In 1972 it had 
affiliated 43 federations and 170 unions, an estimated membership 
of around 400,000 workers. In 1973, four more small federations 
joined. But there were also desertions of important federations; 
that of the Pescadores in 1969; SUTEP in 1972 took away most of 
the teachers from the communist organisation; in 1973 the miners' 
FNTMMP also left.51 In spite of these desertions the CGTP retains 
affiliates in most sectors of the economy, and amongst many re-
gional organisations of labour. Its strength has been clearly 
shown by recent general strikes in Peru; when the CGTP partici-
pates, the strike is successful, when it does not, the strike 
fails. 
Yet one should be careful in identifying in too straight-
forward a fashion the CGTP and the Peruvian Communist party, or 
in assuming that the individual unions affiliated to the CGTP are 
uniformly communist. The Peruvian Communist party is much weaker 
than was the Chilean party up to 1973. It does not command the 
same number of disciplined cadres, nor count on the same degree 
of loyalty from union members. The Peruvian labour force is much 
less highly politicised and class conscious than, for example 
that of Chile or Argentina. Whilst this gives an advantage to a 
small tightly knit group in taking over the direction of the 
union, it also means that the amount of power or control that that 
group has is variable. This is seen, for example, in the number 
of defections from the CGTP, and in the way that the CGTP has 
been pushed into militant action at the local level, as in the 
FETIMP strike in 1974, and the strike in Arequipa in the same 
year. 
Left wing analysis possibly exaggerates the tensions inside 
the CGTP, but there is nevertheless indication that the leader-
ship of the CGTP, in line with Communist party policy, pursues a 
more conciliatory policy than many of its individual adherents, 
not all of which are communist led unions. The left tends to 
ascribe the continuation in control over the CGTP of conciliatory 
PCP members to the lack of political development of the Peruvian 
work force, to their organisational dispersion, and the lack of 
unity amongst the most advanced sectors of the labour movement. 
But the non-Communist left finds it difficult to organise 
some alternative to the CGTP, which still evokes the powerful 
tradition of the CGTP of Mariategui's time. It organises such 
a large part of the labour force that any attempt to split it 
would incur the charge of sectarianism, and would be likely to be 
unsuccessful. Thus most of the extreme left groups opposed the 
idea of creating the CCUSC as a quinta central, arguing that the 
correct tactic was to fight inside and outside the CGTP for cla-
sista policies.55 
The CGTP benefited initially after its rebirth in 1968 from 
widespread dissatisfaction with the labour policies of the Apra 
and of Belaunde's Accion Popular. Many unions felt that they had 
been used as pawns in the party games practised by those two par-
ties, and were anxious to find a confederation more representative 
of workers' interests. Thus the bank workers' federation, the 
FEB, felt that it had been betrayed by the Accion Popular leaders 
in its great strike of 1964, but that the Aprista leaders who re-
placed them had done little better. A powerful reason impelling 
white collar workers into a leftist confederation like the CGTP 
was the feeling that their social position and salary levelg had 
been reduced to the position of capas medias pauperizadas. 
Part of the explanation for the continuing dominance of the 
CGTP has to lie in the lack of alternatives in the labour move-
ment. The Apristas are discredited, the government created CTRP 
has little hope of developing a really independent national fol-
lowing, the vaguely Christian Democratic CNT has never had much 
impact and suffers from the political weakness of the party, and 
the various left wing groups are very divided and quarrelsome 
and still hope to reconstitute the CGTP. Yet the elections for 
the constituent assembly did not show very widespread support for 
the Communist party. It obtained only 207,612 votes electing 6 
members, compared with 433,413 votes and 12 members for the ex-
treme left (and largely trotskyist) FOCEP, and 160,741 votes and 
4 members for the maoist UDP. (in comparison the Apra gained 
1,241,174 votes and elected 37 members). The power of the CGTP 
does not therefore rest on the widespread popularity of the 
Communist party; rather, the power of the party rests on its in-
fluence in the labour movement. 
b. The Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores. (CNT). 
The CNT founded and legally recognised in 1971 is of Chris-
tian Democratic inspiration. Its origins lie in the Movimiento 
Sindical Cristiano del Peru (MOSICP), a group of limited 
importance in the labour movement; but one whose ideas influenced 
the military radicals on labour matters. In July 1969 members of 
the Juventud Politica of the Christian Democratic party, union 
leaders and members of the military government met to discuss 
the formation of the CNT as a way of promoting a union movement 
sympathetic to the ideas of the progressive military leaders. 
But although the CNT was legally recognised only two months 
after its founding as a counterweight to the CGTP, the division 
in the Christian Democratic party (with the departure of many 
members of the Juventud Politica) weakened the force of the pro-
ject. And in 1973 the CNT divided into two.57 Although it still 
retains the loyalty of some federations, it has not emerged with 
any mass impact. Nevertheless, it still commands a certain 
amount of influence through its ideological affinity with the 
progressive phase of the Velasco government. 
c. The Confederacion de Trabajadores del Peru (CTP) 
The CTP is the Apra confederation founded in May 1944 and 
recognised officially in 1964. Until the development of the 
CGTPit was the major political force in the labour movement. 
Its major strength lay in the northern provinces, and to a lesser 
extent in Lima and Callao. It has never had the same level of 
influence in the Arequipa region partly because the labour move-
ment there was shaped by returning miners from Northern Chile, 
and by port and railway workers also connected with the Chilean 
labour movement, whose ideas and attitudes were much more wor-
king class based than those of the Apra party.558 The Apristas 
were strongest in those sectors of the economy that developed 
early in Peru, in the sugar plantations, the copper mines of the 
central sierra, amongst textile workers, printing workers, bank 
employees, teachers, commercial employees, choferes and so on. 
With the development of alternative confederations the Apra lost 
many of its former adherents. Amongst the defectors were the 
bank employees, the printing workers (Federacion Grafica), the 
departmental federation of Ancash, the schoolteachers and the 
miners of Centromln. Its peasant affiliate, the FENCAP, also 
lost much of its support, and its control in the textile sector 
is subject to considerable challenge. It remains strong never-
theless amongst the sugar workers, the choferes and the empleados 
particulares. 
More clearly even than in the case of the Communist party, 
the labour movement attached to the Apra party is subordinated 
to the political ends of the overall movement. The new develop-
ment after 1968, is that the labour movement now has a choice. 
Before that date it was primarily a question of being with or 
against Apra; now there are other alternatives. However, it is 
a little too easy to characterise Apra as an opportunistic move-
ment of the depressed petty bourgeoisie, ready to use force when 
necessary. Most left wing analysis of Apra (and indeed that of 
the military government) tends to adopt such a line of inter' 
pretation. But Hugo Blanco provided a more satisfactory inter-
pretation of its support. He stated that, 
'...we can't characterise the Apra as fascist. 
Certainly it has fascist tendencies, and it might 
split into a social democratic wing... and a fascist 
wing. We have to understand why Apra gained a plu-
rality in the elections. It is the oldest party in 
Peru, and the best organised. It has the longest 
tradition of struggle and has suffered the most 
murders, the most deportations, and the most torture 
victims. It has been persecuted by many dictator-
ships. 
The Communist party has always called the Apra 
fascist and has always had a very sectarian atti-
tude. But on many occasions the Communist party 
has actually stood to the right of Apra. ...And 
the Apra has suffered more persecution than the 
Communist party. So this has something to do with 
the Communist party's great hatred towards the Apra. 
The rest of the left has inherited the Communist 
party's anti-Apra prejudices...' 
The Apra party has a long tradition of using its union 
movement for political purposes. Apra's political influence with 
the Bustamante government from 1945 to 1948 allowed it to con-
solidate its hold over the union movement and to displace the 
communists. In 1948, the secretary general of the CTP, the 
textile leader Arturo Sabroso, declared that 'the CTP which has 
replaced the antiquated theory of the class struggle with a legal 
nationalistic and democratic orientation more closely conforms 
to the general reality of our countries.' And he noted proudly 
that the CTP had declared no strikes during its three years of 
association with the Bustamante government. 
Julio Cotler has argued that Apra's control over labour 
was crucial in the political project of the Peruvian bourgeoisie 
in its development up to the coup of 1968. Apra played the in-
dispensable role as intermediary between the dominant sectors 
and the popular masses.Certainly the Apra exerted its in-
fluence in the labour movement to restrain pay claims following 
the devaluation of 1967 and the subsequent price rise. But the 
short term advantages of this temporary alliance with the 
Belaflnde government were eroded as the expected elections were 
superseded by the 1968 military coup, and labour resentment at 
the policy of Apra turned into desertions to the newly estab-
lished CGTP or at least into disaffiliation from the CTP.63 
Apra has been reduced to its areas of traditional strength. 
In the metalurgical sector for example the recent development of 
that industry meant that it escaped the union hegemony of the 
Apra party, and its young work force has adopted more radical 
forms of political expression.54 In Lima itself the Apra never 
had the support that it aroused in the 'solid' north, partly 
because the greater opportunities for social and economic ad-
vancement in the capital reduced the resentment that fueled the 
displaced middle sector groups of the north, and partly because 
the inhabitants of the capital were more open to the general 
political persuasion and occasional populism of the national 
political leaders.65 
The military government wanted to woo labour from its com-* 
mitment to the Apra party, and by encouraging the formation of 
rival confederations and removing the uniqueness of legal recog-
nition for the CTP, it did encourage unions to secede. Stephens 
argues that the relatively low number of strikes called by the 
CTP after 1968 'reflects the CTP's low mobilisation and influence 
potential over organised labour rather than a purposeful strike 
avoidance policy. In fact the central CTP leadership called 
several strikes between 1972 and 1976 many of which were only 
very sparingly followed and passed without noticeable effect.'65a 
However, it is far too early to dismiss the CTP's influence. The 
Apra was careful to keep open its lines of communications to the 
military government and supported, with reservations, many of its 
reforms. It did oppose the proposed pensions legislation of 
1973; but when the government modified its proposals the CTP was 
loud in its praise. Perhaps for this reason the Minister of 
Labour stated that the major problem of the labour movement was 
the lack of experienced and trained leaders - with the exception 
of the CTP.66 
Although many unions have deserted the Apra, this does not 
mean that class consciousness had developed to such a level that 
the populist or paternalist attractions of Apra are irrelevant. 
On the contrary, the move of Apra back into the centre of the 
political stage might well coincide with a revival of the 
fortunes of the party in the union movement, even if not on the 
same scale as before.67 Apra showed its potential for influence 
in the 1978 SUTEP strike. When it was clear that the strike was 
popular and the leaders determined to carry on, Apra threw its 
weight behind the strike and the government almost immediately 
capitulated. 
The last major redoubt of the Apra in the manufacturing 
sector is in the textile industry, for the Apra was instrumental 
in passing a decree which gave an automatic wage increase in line 
with the cost of living; and during the convivencia period (1956 
to 1962) textile workers also received favourable treatment from 
the s t a t e . B u t when the crisis of the textile industry hit 
the workers in the 1960's, the Apra leadership concluded agree-
ments which allowed employers to dismiss workers, and many 
individual unions left the federation, and an alternative left 
wing Comity de Lucha Textil was c r e a t e d . A t least a quarter of 
the textile workers left the Apra federation between 1968 and 
1973 to join the CGTP.71 
The firmest control that the Apra exercises in the union 
field is amongst the sugar workers. Apra has always had its 
major support and organisation in the north, and amongst the 
workers of the sugar plantations. The military government clear-
ly hoped to erode the influence of the Apra by expropriating the 
large sugar plantations and turning them into cooperatives. 2 
The Apra leaders had been in close collaboration with the plan-
tation owners, and indeed the owners supported Apra against 
possible rivalry by the Communist party amongst the workers.73 
But if the government assumed that this indicated Apra unpopu-
larity amongst the sugar workers it was to be proved wrong. The 
cooperatives were in many cases captured by the former unionists. 
Many of the leaders of the sugar workers' federation the FTAP 
became the leaders of the cooperative movement, including the 
National Central of Sugar Cooperatives (CECOAAP). As Stepan 
points out, 'instead of the cooperative system becoming, as the 
government intended, the sole channel for participation of the 
sugar workers, the Aprista activists have retained all their old 
structures as well as becoming the major forces within the new 
cooperative structures'^ Given the way the government struc-
tured power within the cooperatives, giving overwhelming weight 
to the government appointed technicians and administrators, it 
was hardly surprising that the workers should think that the 
maintenance of trade union activity was as necessary as before 
to defend their interests. As Stepan writes, 
'Much of the reason for the intense resistance by 
the workers to the state's attempt to incorporate them 
into rigidly chartered institutions was the threat 
that such incorporation posed to their own ideology 
and organisation. Intrinsic to the government's 
vision of the cooperatives was that they were apoli-
tical... The official position eventually became 
that as the cooperatives assumed all the vital func-
tions of sugar production and management that the 
unions would wither away. However} before 1968 
labour gains had been closely tied to labour unions, 
most of which were in turn linked to political par-
ties or movements such as the Apristas. Thus in the 
midst of the state intervention period when the go-
vernment was making its argument for cooperatives 
without unions, a poll was taken at one of the 
cooperatives which showed that 78% of the workers 
wanted the unions to remain. In addition to the 
electoral prohibition, trade unionists' anxieties 
and resistance were heightened by clear indications 
that members of the state apparatus were trying to 
hasten the withering away of the unions by removing 
some of the key institutional supports that the 
unions had won in their collective bargaining pacts 
with the haciendas.'75 
The government's proposals for the cooperatives did not 
noticeably improve the lot of the seasonal workers who did not 
en j oy the benefits of union membership. As the cooperative 
structure was not really intended to democratise labour rela-
tions on the sugar plantations,the proposals aroused the hostil-
ity of organised labour without gaining the gratitude of the 
unorganised workers. 
Although there are only some 24,000 sugar workers by 1969 
(compared with 46,197 in 1940), they control the fate of a key 
export sector. In certain regions the government recognised the 
hold of the unions, and in La Libertad, the area of 45% of 
coastal sugar production, according to Scott, 'the Apra agreed 
not to sabotage the CAPs, nor to mobilise the plantation pro-
letariat against the state, so long as party and union members 
obtained access to power within the CAPs and CECOAAP, and the 
material living and working conditions of the labour force con-
tinued to improve. The military were relatively content with 
this arrangement which appeared to promise political stability 
in the industry, and allow the flow of foreign exchange, tax 
revenues and agrarian debt payments to the State. In this way 
the sugar CAPs would be paraded as model examples of self mana-
ged enterprises in an economic system that was ,:neither com-
munist nor capitalist".'76 
Apra remains the most popular single party in Peru. It 
is quite possible that in union elections workers vote for left 
wing candidates, while in national political elections they will 
cast their vote for the Apra. Aprals strength does not, there-
fore, lie in its union base as is the case with the Communist 
party. Its undoubtedly popular following and powerful machine do 
provide resources, however, that the party can mobilise to 
maximise its appeal to the labour movement. And its membership 
of the ORIT and its close association with American trade union-
ism is useful in providing funds and in training leaders. It is 
not averse to the use of violence in union matters; and it is not 
unknown for the Apra bufalos to dislodge union leaders physically 
from their headquarters, seize the union offices and install a 
new leadership. While this taetxc may bring only short term ad-
vantages, its impact should not be minimised in situations where, 
as at present, Apra's influence with the government is increa-
sing. 
d. The Comite" de Coordinacion y Unificacion Sindical Clasista 
(CCUSC) 
The CCUSC was formed in 1974 as an attempt to unify the 
forces of the 'clasista' left in the union movement. It was not 
entirely clear whether the CCUSC was intended to displace the 
CGTP or to renovate it from within. This uncertainty of purpose 
tended to weaken the CCUSC; but probably more damage was caused 
by the sectarian attitude and undemocratic tactics of the con-
trolling maoist group associated with the party Patria Roja, and 
influential amongst the teachers of SUTEP and the miners of 
Centromih.77 
The first assembly of the CCUSC in 1974 appeared to have 
been reasonably successful (at least a lot more successful than 
the second). Several federations were represented including the 
FNTMMP, SUTEP, and Centromin; in total there were delegates from 
6 national federations, 6 regional federations, 9 departmental 
federations, 1 sectoral federation and 129 base unions (of which 
77 were affiliated to the CGTP, 2 to the CTP, 1 to the CNT, 3 to 
the CTRP, and 74 not affiliated). The organisers claimed a 
rather exaggerated 50% representation of all organised labour.778 
The initial spirit of unity was not to last very long. The 
differing political ideologies and ambitions of the various mao-
ist, trotskyist and marxist groups that came together to form the 
CCUSC could not bury their differences for long. The groups 
were united in their hostility to the government, but could not 
decide whether it was fascist, semi'fascist or representative 
of the national bourgeoisie. It was alleged against some groups 
notably the Patria Roja, that they were confusing the nature of 
the political party with that of the union, and that by using the 
unions for activities that were properly those of the party, they 
were exposing the unions to direct attack by the government and 
endangering the fragile unity of the union movement.80 The 
second CCUSC congress was marked by undemocratic tactics of the 
Patria Roja group which awarded itself the lion's share of the 
delegate places and excluded the Confederacion Campesina del Peru 
in order to retain its control over the CCUSC.81 The result was 
defections from the organisation and a relapse into the vitriolic 
bickering that is so strong a feature of the Peruvian left. 
However, the fate of CCUSC is more important than an ac-
count of its turbulent internal conflict might suggest. It does 
represent an attempt not just to unite unions, but also to bring 
into union movements those sectors of the petty bourgeoisie that 
are organised. It is a tenet of the maoist left especially, that 
the petty bourgeoisie has a fundamental role to play in the 
revolution. As one maoist party declared, 'Historical experience 
shows that the petty bourgeoisie has played a positive role in 
the revolutions of those countries that have achieved indepen- 82 . \ 
dence and that are constructing socialism This emphasis on 
the role of the middle sectors is one that Apra made its own for 
so long. In a way the maoist parties are the heirs to the Apra 
tradition, (though not to the organisational discipline that 
also characterises the Apra). It was a commonplace of govern-
ment criticism of the ultra-left that they were simply the shock 
troups of Apra, wittingly or unwittingly serving Apra's ends. 
Although this is an exaggeration and does little justice to the 
hatred of Apra amongst leaders of the left, it is understandable 
that the government might see a collusion in what was a coin-
cidence of aim - all out opposition to the government. 
The most prominent member of the CCUSC is the SUTEP.84 
Schoolteachers organised in SUTEP became a powerful political 
force in Peru in the 1970s. They occupy an important, if sec-
tarian, position in the union movement. They have been a con-
stant source of troublesome opposition to the military govern-
ment. ('Here the choice is clear, either the revolution or 
SUTEP. They want to overthrow the government. Well let them 
try if they can and take the consequences' President Velasco). 
They articulate the interests of an important sector of the 
urban, often provincial, lower middle class, a class that has 
expanded rapidly during and since the 1960s and whose expansion 
has been associated with increasing economic and political frus-
tration and resentment. SUTEP, under Maoist control, has turned 
that resentment into political militancy with revolutionary over-
tones. SUTEP's growth has to be related to the central impor-
tance of education as a political issue in Peru. Education has 
been abasic means of social mobility, and an important source of 
employment. One of SUTEP's strengths lies in the widespread 
popular support it arouses. The politics of SUTEP is coloured 
by the peculiarities of the Peruvian left. The Communist party 
was badly affected firstly by the Sino-Soviet splits of the mid 
1960s and then by its uncritical support for the military govern-
ment from 1968 to 1977. Few of the many leftist groups in Peru 
attract much support, though the recent elections demonstrate 
quite impressive strength. But two groups that did make an im-
pact were the Maoist group Patria Roja, amongst the teachers and 
the miners of Centromin, and the marxist Vanguardia Revoluciona-
ria in rural areas. 
Are schoolteachers maoists? Not in any profound ideologi-
cal sense. The allegiance of schoolteachers to their union 
leaders is instrumental. For a number of reasons the maoists are 
seen by the teachers as the best group to fight for redress of 
their deeply held grievances. 
Three factors need emphasis. Firstly, the political his-
tory of schoolteachers1 unions. At the same time as numbers 
expanded dramatically, teachers felt that they had been betrayed 
firstly by the Apra and then by the Communist party. The number 
of teachers rose from 64,000 in 1958 to 118,000 in 1968. In 
1965 Peru was spending 5.1% of its GNP on education (the highest 
in Latin America). Belaunde, for political reasons, in the 
famous law 15215 promised four annual increases of 25%. But only 
two increases were granted. Many were attracted into the pro-
fession but then angered when salaries were frozen. Neither Apra, 
by then supporting Belaunde, nor later the Communists, made great 
efforts to reinstate the promised increases. Indeed in a couple 
of notable strikes, the teachers felt betrayed by those two 
parties. Normal schools and university faculties of education 
were over-producing. They became agents of socialisation for 
the ultra-left. Their graduates took the initiative in establi-
shing the local organisations that formed the SUTEP in 1972. 
Secondly, there was the impact on the teaching profession 
of the government's proposed educational reform. Whatever the 
underlying intention of the reform the reaction of the teachers 
was hostile. The attack on their teaching methods and the in-
sistence on a complete change was an insult to their professional 
pride. The demand that they should work harder for no extra pay 
was seen as a further economic injustice, especially as for many 
teachers the new system would make more difficult the holding of 
multiple jobs. The stress on ideological indoctrination was un-
welcome to a group that did not share that ideology. Teachers 
objected to the way that the reform was imposed from above with-
out adequate consultation with the teachers themselves. And they 
viewed, with fully justified cynicism, the fact that the much 
hated Ministry of Education was, unreformed itself, going to 
impose the reform. (This touches on a major problem of the Ve-
lasco period; how could one expect a civil service formed in one 
tradition, with ideas and modes of behaviour characteristic of 
the social and economic structure of Peru before 1968, to adapt 
to a totally different policy, without its own internal reform?). 
At a time when teachers were being arrested, deported and 
imprisoned for pursuit of what they felt were legitimate 
grievances, they could hardly be expected to collaborate in the 
educational reform. 
Thirdly, the explanation of teachers' maoism has to be re-
lated to their complex class position. Education is seen as a 
classic form of social ascent to the middle class from the upper 
levels of the working class or the better off peasantry, and from 
small towns to the provincial capital or to Lima itself. 
Teachers have the social ambition of those who wish to improve 
their individual status and the social resentment of those who 
find that crossing that class barrier amounts to rather little in 
terms of status, income, or power. The militant teachers appear 
to be the younger ones, not far removed from training (and poli-
tical socialisation) in the escuelas normales and the faculties 
of education, and who work in the provincial towns and Lima. The 
Lima SUTEP appears to be marginally more moderate than SUTEP 
nationally (and collaborates with the UDP, a tactic rejected by 
the national SUTEP). 
Although SUTEP declarations are written in the language of 
Maoism, e.g. that Peru is 'semi feudal, neocolonial and in 
transit towards dependent capitalism', aided of course by the 
military, there were two major episodes of 'collaboration' with 
the system, in contrast to numerous instances of conflict at all 
levels. 
Firstly there were the conversations with Velasco in late 
1974. The reasons for the conversations were varied: Velasco 
himself favoured them (though not the Ministry of Education); 
the teachers saw this as an important way to secure the release 
of recently arrested leaders; there was rank and file pressure 
to accept negotiations if this led to salary increases; perhaps 
the government saw in the teachers the nucleus of a social base 
for the regime - as Belatinde had done. After all, teachers were 
numerous, reasonably well organised, with considerable influence 
locally in areas where the military had reason to feel alarm about 
social tension, in the Sierra for example and in the pueblos 
jovenes; and the social origins (and ambitions) of teachers and 
military men were not so disimilar. But the gaps were too wide 
and the talks collapsed. 
Secondly, after constantly denouncing the teachers' cooper-
atives as a shabby facade to preserve capitalism, SUTEP decided 
to put up candidates for the elections for the management of the 
cooperatives. Why the change? Firstly SUTEP argued that they 
could change the system of obligatory contributions by teachers 
to voluntary ones and so undermine the cooperatives and gain 
popularity with teachers; secondly, they wanted to demonstrate 
in open elections - which they did handsomely - that they and not 
the government's SERP were the true representatives of the teach-
ers. Thirdly, the money was an attraction for the union and for 
its controlling group Patria Roja. However, as observers pre-
dicted (and as the government hoped?) control of the cooperatives 
was not an unmixed blessing. Squabbling soon broke out over the 
use of fundsf the union split, accusations of fraud flew around 
and the government intervened and closed most of them.. 
By 1977 it seemed that much of SUTEPrs impetus was spent, 
The union was divided, with SUTELM opposing the national leader^ 
ship. Control over the funds of the cooperatives had been lost. 
Patria Rojars attempt to create ^ quinta central, the CCUSC, 
after a promising start had fallen into the sectarian ways so 
common on the left and only SUTEP and Centromm remained in 
CCUSC in belligerent opposition to the rest of the union world. 
Government repression had led to the imprisonment of many leaders, 
police infiltration was common, and the union headquarters had 
been intervened. 
The 1978 eight week strike of SUTEP shows that this con-
clusion was incorrect. Or at least only partially correct. 
Government repression eased with the election of the constituent 
assembly. Popular support for teachers, always strong, has 
proved to be even stronger, with the church and even private 
schools coming out in support. The recent austerity measures 
are severe enough to revive militancy not just in SUTEP but^also 
in other repressed labour groups. And the left has taken en-
couragement from the results of the constituent assembly elec-
tions. But the strike does underline points made earlier; that 
the grievances of the teachers are deeply felt, that they enjoy 
public sympathy, that they see militant action as the only 
remedy, and that the maoist groups are, in those circumstances 
providing the leadership that commands the support of the rank 
and file. 
The other mainstay of the CCUSC are the copper miners of 
the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, nationalised in 1974 and now 
known as Centromin. The Peruvian mining sector can be divided 
into a modern and a traditional one. The southern mines are more 
recent, more technologically advanced, and the work force is more 
urban in origin. The mines of Cerro de Pasco are more backward, 
situated in the bleak and inhospitable sierra, and the origin 
of many of the miners is rural. " The industry is strike ridden. 
In 1970 there were 71 strikes in mining, accounting for 29% of 
national strikes and 69% of man hours lost; and of those man 
hours lost 80% were accounted for by the miners of Centromin.®7 
Centromin employs about 15,000 workers, 85% of whom were 
classed as manual workers (52% were interior miners). Many of 
these miners regard themselves as mineros comuneros; that is to 
say that they have left their peasant communities for a temporary 
period to make some money and then to return. Over 90% of the 
miners come from the central sierra provinces and though they 
stay on average something like 13 years in the enterprise only a 
few bring their families.88 One of their first and fiercest 
battles was to fight against that proposal of the agrarian reform 
that would have disregarded miners' rights to participate in the 
new communities set up by the agrarian reform legislation. 
For many years, apart from some intermittent explosions of 
violence they had been a fairly passive labour force, later to 
fall under the control of the Apra party. But as Kruijt and 
Vellinga note 'Apra's power in the labour movement of the Central 
Peruvian mining sector had been based at the federation level 
from the very start. The individual affiliated unions did not 
always follow Apra policy and were only motivated by pragmatic 
reasons to cooperate with the Aprista federal and central or-
ganisations. It would have been much more difficult to con-
clude successful collective wage agreements outside of Apra 
controlled channels1. And they add 'none of the political par-
ties and movements...really had very strong roots among the rank 
and file and the latter were apt to be quite independent in the 
long run frequently changing allegiance'. With the change of 
government in 1968 and proposals for nationalisation, with the 
decline of the Apra, and with a history of independent political 
affiliations and occasional use of fierce violence, and suffering 
from miserable living and working conditions, it is not sur-
prising that maoist groups have been able to steer the protests 
of the miners. 
The government has repressed several strikes in this area 
very brutally. Teachers' strikes may be irritating but they do 
not hit a crucial export sector. The annoyance of the government 
with the copper unions is neatly summed up by the following ex-
tract from a government report: 
'The trade union movement is led by badly educated 
leaders poisoned by the defects of underdevelopment 
whose political motives are frequently contrary to 
the political line developed by the government. 
Because of this, the trade union rank and file, com-
posed of workers from the very lowest cultural and 
educational levels of society have supported their 
leaders who are adopting the traditional politics 
of class struggle. Their demands are usually ir-
rational and impossible to achieve and they maintain 
extremist positions which are irreconcilable with the 
companies. Because of their low level of education 
...the workers ignore the fact that a very large 
increase in their wages, improvements in their 
working conditions and a shorter working day will 
not only weaken the mining company, but will cause 
damage to the state and to all the Peruvian people 
The miners continue to be a problem to the government. 
The difference between their behaviour now and in 1968 is that 
they are much more politicised, better organised and led by 
political figures of national prominence, who, unlike leaders of 
the past have not betrayed the rank and file for party ends. 
e. The Central de Trabajadores de la Revoluciffn Peruana (CTRP). 
The CTRP was founded in November 1972 and recognised in 
December 1972, As the CTRP was created by the government such 
speedy recognition is not so remarkable. 
According to the account of Hector Bejar, a former guerrilla 
leader who became a SINAMOS functionary, General Velasco, tired 
of strikes, especially in the mining zones, became convinced 
that in the same way as the political parties had their union 
confederation, so the revolution should have its own. However, 
SINAMOS had a rather different notion of the function of such an 
organisation than the more conservative views of the Ministries 
of Labour, Interior and Industry. 
'En SINAMOS crefamos que, si no se atacaba a fondo 
la corrupcion del Ministerio de Trabajo, si no se 
limpiaba las corruptelas delMinisterio del Interior, 
si no se 'barrfa1 con los notables que 'fungian' de 
autoridades locales, si no se corregia radicalmente 
el comportamiento procapitalista de muchos funciona-
rios del Ministerio de Industria, no se podia esperar 
que los trabajadores creyesen en la revolucion, por 
m£s radicales reformas de estructura que esta em-
prendiese r. 
However the radicals of the Arqa Laboral of SINAMOS found 
themselves outmanoeuvred by the more conservative elements. 
The dominant group became the MLR of General Tantalean with its 
control over the Federacion de Pescadores, a union that had bro-
ken away from the control first of the Aprista and then of the 
Communists, only to fall into the hands of the group of sinister 
gangsters who controlled the fishing industry.^ It is also 
alleged that behind the MLR were a group of trotskyists who wan-
ted to involve it in a 'provocative and cynical anti-communism' 
and young apristas bent on the same end. Moreover the idea of the 
MLR and the CTRP as an anti-communist force appealed to the in-
telligence services of the armed forces and indeed to the entre-
preneurs . 
The CTRP was quickly built up by a number of measures, not 
all of them scrupulous. Parallel unions were created, leaders 
were bribed or threatened, existing unions were 'taken over' 
whether the members wanted it or not. But the CTRP was not able 
to make much headway amongst the strongholds of organised labour. 
It was more prominent in smaller firms with little previous ex-
perience of union organisation, and in the commercial and business 
sectors rather than in industry or mining. There was no other 
union comparable in size or importance to the 30,000 strong 
Federacion de Pescadores. 
But the result was not quite what the government expected. 
The fall of Tantalean meant the end of the MLR and its control 
over the FPP, which under new leadership was to resume an in-
dependent role and to mount a massive three month strike against 
the government in 1976. Many unions, once recognised through 
their affiliation to the CTRP, switched to join the CGTP.97 The 
very encouragement given to unions allowed union leaders to take 
seriously the rhetoric of the government and to act like unions 
normally do at times of economic crisis. A gap grew between the 
leadership of the CTRP, imposed by the government loyal to it, and 
many rank and file unions which were very critical of the 
government. The so-called 100 base unions of the CTRP Lima went 
so far in 1976 as to censure the top leaders for being corrupt 
and manipulatory.The CTRP Lima has continued its radical line 
playing an important part in planning and executing the general 
strike of 1977. 
The government hoped to impede the emergence of a politi-
cised union leadership. CTRP leaders could not be reelected; 
they had to take turns in leadership positions; and they could 
not be members of any political party. This was intended to 
preserve the autonomy and encourage the participation of the rank 
and file, and prevent the leadership from being captured by any 
one political tendency. But such provisions proved inadequate. 
The failure of the government was similar to the failure that 
Stepan described in the pueblos jovenes. It was too 'political1. 
The structure may have been adequate, but what benefits were to 
be provided? Clearly not enough compared with the benefits 
that could be obtained from free trade union action in associ-
ation with other groups in the labour movement.1^0 
The major attempt at incorporation of the working class 
took place through the industrial community and it is to this 
that we must now turn. 
The Comunidad Industrial. (CI) 
According to the General Industries Law of 1970 all indus-
trial firms with six or more workers, or a gross annual income 
of more than one million soles, were to form a CI composed of 
all the permanent employees. The CI was to receive a share of 
profits to invest in the firm until it reached the level of 50% 
of shares. The CI also shares increasingly in the management of 
the enterprise, and there is some distribution of profits to the 
workers. 
The odd thing is that there seems to have been no partic-
ular pressure from workers, and certainly not from management for 
the proposal, though it was consonent with the major political 
project of the military, emphasising participation without class 
conflict. The most detailed study of the CI sees it as the di-
rect expression of the ideology of communitarianism of the mili-
tary, an ideology of petty bourgeois extraction, anti-oligarchi-
cal, nationalistic and above the class struggle.^ It was_to 
be co-gestion, not auto-gestion, according to Velasco.3 Earlier 
Velasco had insisted that it was a gradual process that did not 
imply the disappearance of private enterprise. 
There are many ambiguities in the development of the CI, 
and in the government's attitude. But one thing is clear. They 
were intended to be instruments of class harmony, and as such 
were expected to render redundant the functions of the trade 
unions.^ But the planned coexistence of managers, white collar 
workers and manual workers within the CI, and the limitation of 
the CI to a firm and not to the sector, also indicated the limits 
of worker self management. Essentially a vertical chain of com-
mand would still operate. It did not seem to be considered 
initially that the kind of capital-JLabour harmony proposed was 
in contradiction to the past history of such relations or that 
there were good reasons for such conflict generated by the cap-
italist system of production rather than by the benevolence or 
malevolence of the entrepreneurs. Another important reason for 
the development of the CI was that it was seen as an alternative 
and better mode of capital accumulation, by stimulating the re-
investment of the funds of the CI. But in this respect as well 
the achievement fell short of the promise. 
However, there were very differing opinions inside the 
government about the role of the CI. SINAMOS in its first 
flush of enthusiasm saw the CI as the basis for a widespread 
participacionista movement, and as the basis of solid worker 
support for the radical line of the government. But SINAMOS 
still remained concerned that any such development should not 
be captured by the Communist party and was always alert to the 
possibility of such 'infiltration1. The Ministry of Industry on 
the other hand had a much more limited view of the role of the 
CI and never favoured the idea of a community of CI. The first 
conference to train CI leaders organised by the MIT was hurriedly 
cancelled when it was discovered that some of the organisers were 
urging the participants to take a radical view of their functions, 
and such leftist elements were quickly expelled.6 
The reaction of the trade unionists to the CI ranged from 
cautious suspicion to downright hostility, which was hardly sur-
prising as they were not consulted about an institution which 
they were informed would render the activities of the unions 
irrelevant. The left denounced it wholeheartedly, without seeing 
how the CI might be used for its advantage. The exception was 
the Communist party which saw that the CI could in fact be used 
to strengthen unions, and the party urged its unionists to en-
sure that they extracted maximum benefit from the law.^ The 
Apra gave the proposals a mild welcome, praising those parts that 
seemed consistent with, if not derived from, their own long 
standing ideas on the merit of class harmony, and decrying those 
they felt were a copy of an alien, Yugoslav model. 
The reaction of the employers was generally hostile. Small 
businessmen obj ected to the CI for they felt it would undermine 
their traditional personal control over their workforce. Large 
firms might have welcomed in theory and, in practice at first, 
the potential that the CI offered for coopting the workforce and 
raising productivity; but when it became clear that the CI would 
serve as an instrument for the politicisation of the work force 
they also opposed it. Alberti reports the result of a survey 
which shows that where the employers consider that the CI has a 
positive integrating function the firms are usually small, with 
personalist social relationships, and a low level of political 
consciousness and trade union experience on the part of the 
work force.^ Most employers went to great lengths to evade the 
legislation and to bring pressure, eventually successful, to 
modify the provisions of the law. 
The CI had grown to include an important part of the work-
force. By the end of 1974 there were 3,535 CI (with another 
253 in the fishing sector, 74 in mining and 52 in telecommuni-
cations) comprising 199,070 workers out of a total of 229,537 
beneficiaries. They made up 5.9% of the active labour force 
and contributed 20.8% to the GNP. The CI by the end of 1974 
owned 13% of the capital of their sector, and participation in 
profits accounted for 4.8% of earning of the workers.11 But 
there were considerable discrepancies between the various CI. 
Those working in profitable enterprises did well; those in less 
profitable ones not so well. Fewer than half the workers in the 
CI received benefits in three consecutive years following the 
establishment of the CI.1^ Temporary workers were excluded from 
benefits, and inside the enterprise the share in benefits was 
proportionate to earnings. Durand gives the example of one firm 
where the two directors each earned cash benefits from the CI 
twelve times those of the average of the 149 workers.13 The CI 
was not an instrument for ensuring social equality. Participa-
tion in the running of enterprises was often an illusion, as 
employers used various devices to keep workers, who anyhow were 
in a minority, away from real authority. 
If the intention of the government was to promote class 
harmony, it must have been very disappointed. Especially in the 
large factories, union and CI joined together in a reinforced 
effort to secure benefits for their members on a wide variety of 
fronts, some properly those of the unions, others those of the 
CI. Alberti quotes the leader of one CI: 
fAsi poco a poco la CI concientiza. Permite ver 
a la empresa por adentro. Aqui nunca hubo sindicato 
y por lo que vimos en la CI, lo organizamos...Pero 
en la CI tratamos de que se de cuenta de que la 
lucha no es por la plata, que en esta CI es muy poca. 
Es de concientizacion, es para el futuro'15 
The relationship between union and CI is not altogether 
uniform. Generally the bigger the enterprise, the more likely 
there was a strong union that could combine with a CI to produce 
a higher share of benefits. The CI is most likely to fall 
under the influence of the union when therfeis a manual union 
with a high and uniform level of political commitment. But there 
are cases where the union is weak and the CI strong, or when the 
relations between the two are competitive rather than complemen-
tary (when for example the CI is captured by a white collar union 
that espouses a distinct political line from the manual unions).17 
In some cases the CI can act as an intermediary between the union 
and the enterprise. In general where there was no union existing 
before, the establishment of the CI has helped to create a union 
union. 
Whatever the variation in the relationship between union, 
enterprise and CI, overall the employers used the existence of 
the CI to attack the government, and the unions used the CI as an 
instrument for confronting the employers. The government acknow-
ledged the failure of the undertaking, and the success of the 
employers, by the modifications introduced to the CI law in 1976 
(and by virtual abandonment of the plans to overcome the distri-
butive problems of the CI by the establishment of social property 
enterprises). President Morales Bermudez confessed that the CI 
idea was theoretically confused, very idealistic and full of good 
intentions, but not suitable for the Peruvian reality. The CI 
was abolished in small firms, the maximum shareholding of the CI 
was reduced to 33%, shares would be held individually and would 
carry no voting rights. 'The CI became nothing more than a 
sophisticated profit sharing mechanism, no longer threatening 
the capitalists1 control of p r o d u c t i o n 2 0 
The CI did not remain without national coordination, and 
in 1973 there was held the first Congress of the Communities 
(CONACI). But the move did not arise from the spontaneous ini^ 
tiative of the CI. It was an impulse from SINAMOS, which wanted 
a national organisation to show how successful it was in its 
tasks of promotion, to demonstrate that participation was 
possible in the new Peru, and, more radically, to pave the way 
for a widespread transference of the CI enterprises to the social 
property sector. CONACI needed SINAMOS, too, in order to guar-
antee its existence, to finance its activities, and to act as an 
intermediary with the highest levels of decision taking. 
SINAMOS adopted, initially at least, a radical posture that was 
not shared by other sectors of the bureaucracy; the stance of 
the original members of the area laboral of SINAMOS became known 
as the opci(5*n de la guerrilla burocratica. But it was not an op-
tion that was to be open for very long. 
The first CONACI congress showed that the members of the 
CIs wanted to go even further perhaps than the SINAMOS radicals 
considered advisable. In the declaration of principles of the 
congress the 'irreplaceable role of the unions was stressed', 
which was not really what SINAMOS wanted. The MIT was doubly 
offended by the radical tone of the congress and declared that 
its activities were purely negative, sectional and showed the 
influence of the communists. SINAMOS tried to defend the process 
by pointing to the emergence of a group of new young workers' 
leaders who could be won over to aid the Peruvian revolution 
(though this was an even more dangerous development for most sec-
tors of the bureaucracy). Delegates to CONACI did seem to repre-
sent a new generation of leaders, many of whom did not have 
strong political affiliations. At least there were no solid 
groups of party members identifiable by the uniformity of their 
voting, although there were undoubtedly a substantial number of 
CTP delegates representing the textile sector, and CGTP delegates 
associated with the metallurgical sector, confecciones, and 
leather workers. But it was also quite clear that a large number 
of delegates, from the provinces especially, were controlled by 
SINAMOS, and that radical denunciations of the whole idea of the 
CI proposed by the SIDERPERU delegation were roundly defeated in 
the plenary sessions of the c o n g r e s s . 
Although many of the declarations of the CONACI were radi-
cal sounding, apart from the emphasis on the need for 
coordination with the unions they were not out of line with the 
general stance of the SINAMOS radicals, even in their insistence 
that the CI did not represent a decisive break with the capital-
ist system, but could only be regarded as a transitional step on 
the road to Peruvian socialism. The resolutions of the congress 
roundly denounced the CTRP as lla accion divisionista, anarqui-
zante y amarilla de elementos desclasados que con falsos argu-
mentos y seudo teorias pretenden Lreorientar' al movimiento 
sindical peruanor, though as Pasara is careful to point out, few 
of these resolutions were debated before they were passed, so 
that it may be misleading to assume that they reflect the general 
feeling of the delegates. 
The executive body set up by the congress is equally dif-
ficult to pin down in political terms. There is what Pasara 
describes as a vague ex-CTP air about the body, but it identified 
itself with the postulates of the government and not with any 
particular union confederation, and it remained financially de-
pendent upon SINAMOS for virtually everything (and SINAMOS used 
threats to cut off funds if CONACI stepped out of line).25 The 
emphasis on the continuing need for unions is a sign of communist 
influence, especially marked in those CI with more than 100 
members. 
CONACI was not a particularly strong organisation. Stephens 
notes that 'the lack of participation from the base was the crucial 
weakness of CONACI from the beginning because it restricted or-
ganisational life by and large to leadership activites and made 
it heavily dependent on interactions between different personali-
ties.'26 There was widespread ignorance about CI legislation 
even amongst the leaders of important federations. The problem 
facing the government organisers at first was not so much oppos-
ition as indifference. 
Yet the government was forced to divide the CONACI in an 
attempt to reestablish control. How did this come about? The 
problem was partly that SINAMOS did its work too well. The 
radicals of that organisation were taken seriously by the leaders 
of CONACI and that organisation began to press for the implemen-
tation of policies that the government, by now moving to the 
right, began to find unacceptable. SINAMOS conceived its task as 
that of creating base organisations that would bring pressure to 
bear upon the government; unfortunately the government decided to 
resist such pressures. And the government was seriously worried 
by those enterprises going into bankruptcy that were taken over 
by their workers to demand incorporation into the social property 
sector; a process that was promoted by SINAMOS, and that to right 
wing government bureaucrats looked too reminiscent of the tomas 
de empresa of Allende's Chile. 
The government, having by now rid SINAMOS of Jos£ Luis Al-
varado and his radicals in the Area laboral, set up a Comision 
Reorganizadora of CONACI, which contained a majority of CIs but 
because they were the smaller and weaker ones, more subject 
to government influence, only a minority of members of the CIs. 
The effort was not successful.. According to Thorndike CR 
CONACI disintegrated amidst the indifference if not the relief 
of the working class, and to save face the MIT proposed the reun-
ification of the two CONACI,28 Yet the main CONACI did not ex-
press opposition to the government;if anything it tended to re-
emphasise its loyalties to the original objectives of the govern-
ment, and though it spent much time on internal squabbles with 
the CR CONACI, in public it tended to ignore it. 
Although the two CONACIs reunited, the influence of the 
movement declined. It was always dependent upon the government, 
and although the government did not succeed in making CONACI the 
basis of support amongst the working class, neither could CONACI 
with all its structural, financial and organisational limitations, 
really hope to achieve any independent autonomous existence as an 
instrument of the working class struggle. Nevertheless at the 
local level the effect of the CI reform has been to strengthen 
worker organisation and to encourage trade union action, even if 
the modifications to the CI law means that the community can no 
longer hope to control the enterprise. 
Conclusions: the military and the labour movement. 
The military government miscalculated in its treatment of 
organised labour. The Plan Inca's statement about unions captures 
both the disdain that the military felt towards organised labour, 
and the authoritarian tone of its proposed reforms; it attacked 
'politicised unionism with corrupt leadership' and stated that 
'reorganisation of the union system (was needed) for the benefit: 
of the workers themselves. State control over labour was no 
invention of the military government. General Odria created a 
modern Ministry of Labour and developed a divisionist and patern-
alist policy, aided by extensive use of police infiltration and 
repression (though he, too, had to face massive worker protest in, 
for example, A r e q u i p a ) . But the attempt at cooptation and 
coercion was taken much further under the military governments 
since 1968. 
The miscalculation towards labour is only one of a series 
of miscalculations as Peru is in the grip of one of its most 
severe economic and political crises. But the effect of labour 
hostility towards the government was not merely of secondary im-
portance. As Rosemary Thorp writes, 'The IMF's negotiations with 
Peru...have tended to emphasise the relationship between exchange 
rate, confidence and short term capital, while the underlying 
thinking of the Fund is clearly that a healthy undistorted economy 
will attract long term capital. Unfortunately it appears that in 
the Peruvian context capital movements, both long term and short 
term, are related far more closely to more intangible variables 
of confidence in internal policy making, and issue such as the 
Comunidad Laboral. Given this, the atmosphere of strikes and po-
litical uncertainty at least partly associated with the stabilis-
ation effort was such as to make sure that movements on private 
capital account would not be favourable'.31 
The failure of the attempt to incorporate labour has to be 
situated in the context of the definition given to participation 
by the regime. The military wanted participation and mobilisation 
on its terms, not on those of the participants. It mistrusted any 
mobilisation that it did not directly control, even those that 
sprang up almost spontaneously in defence of the government as 
after the riots of 1975.32 Stepan points out that in all the new 
ideas expressed by the military in their writings before the coup, 
the idea of participation was conspicuous by its absence,33 and 
when they did turn their attention to the theme, there was very 
considerable variation in the meaning they gave to the idea in 
practice as can be seen, for example, in the differing ideas of 
SINAMOS and the MIT towards the organisation of the CI. As George 
Philip writes; 
'It would be necessary to grant the new organis-
ation (that is, one organised to mobilise support 
for the regime) enough influence to induce indepen^ 
dent civilians to associate themselves with it, but 
at the same time it could not be allowed to escape 
military control. Moreover it had to act in a way 
that was compatible with other government objectives 
- it could not be permitted to engage in strikes 
against government owned enterprises or agitate 
against government policy. Finally it needed to 
be strong enough to compete successfully with its 
other potential rivals ~ the Apristas, the Communists 
and the parties of the far left. As it turned out 
these requirements could not be met.' 
There was a world of difference between the ideas on par-
ticipation expressed by General Leonidas Rodriguez, for example, 
and those of General Tantalean. 
The military failed to coopt or eventually to coerce the 
labour movement for various reasons. The policy of the military 
was not clear; it was ambiguous about the role of unions in the 
new society. Some leaders wanted to work with labour, others to 
control it in a strict vertical line of command. The military 
government did however stimulate the growth of labour 
organisations, but in the absence of economic inducements of the 
right sort, this growth turned into a source of extra hostility 
to the government rather than a source of support. The govern-
ment failed particularly badly in its handling of public sector 
unions, especially the schoolteachers. Although the peasantry had 
their agrarian reform, urban labour the CI, and the shanty town 
dwellers their pueblo joven organisations, the petty-bourgeois 
civil servants were offered "very little, apart from an educational 
reform about which they had not been consulted and which they did 
not like. 
The very weakness and dispersion of the movement made it 
more difficult to control. The multiplicity of confederations, 
regional and provincial organisations, sectoral federations and 
multiple plant unions meant that power in the union movement was 
very diffuse and therefore not so easy to manipulate. Cooptation, 
through the CTRP, did succeed initially with some of the smaller 
unions especially in commerce and services, but even that proved 
to be a temporary gain. The government was not prepared to be 
tough enough with entrepreneurs to gain the support of labour; it 
wanted the collaboration of both to build a new moral order. 
Apart from the historically dubious validity of such an alliance, 
the economic crisis that hit Peru after 1974 never allowed the 
government enough room to manoeuvre. 
And yet it is difficult to withhold respect from a govern-
ment which however disastrously it may have ended, did at least 
start with the intention of improving the welfare and dignity of 
a notoriously poor and oppressed people. So perhaps it is-appro-
priate to end with some words of General Velasco, words that seem 
sadly ironical today but that in their time promised generosity 
and hope. 
For Velasco, the revolution in Peru, 'had as its end the 
construction in our country of a social democracy of full par-
ticipation, that is to say, a system based on a moral order of 
solidarity, not individualism; on an economy fundamentally self 
managing, in which the means of production are predominantly 
social property; and on a political order where the decision 
making power far from being monopolised by the political and 
economic oligarchies is grounded in social, economic and polite 
ical institutions directed, without intermediation or with a 
minimum of it, by the men and women that form them.' 
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